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INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND AIR POLLUTION
JAMES M. KRAMON*
The problems presented by the enormous increase in air pollution
since the start of the Industrial Revolution are only beginning to
plague mankind. Many of the traditional remedies afforded by
Anglo-American law are poorly adapted to deal with this condition.
The purpose of this article is to examine the possible applications of
one recognized form of action-the suit in inverse condemnation-to
the problem of air pollution.
I
THE AIR POLLUTION PROBLEM
It is clear to anyone who has lived or traveled in any large metropolitan area that air pollution is for millions of people, part of their
way of life. According to the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, sixty percent of all Americans are presently enduring excessive pollution in the ambient air.1 The most obvious consequence
of such a situation is the atrocious degree of filth to which most city
dwellers have become accustomed.2 Were this the only consequence
of air pollution, it would be reason enough for concern. Unfortunately, the consequences are far more severe.
Reliable medical authorities concur unanimously in the opinion
that air pollution is a major contributing factor to lung cancer, heart
disease, ventricular failure, asthma, pulmonary fibrosis, emphysema,
bronchitis, flu, tonsillitis, sore throats, headaches, tiredness, allergies
and the common cold.3 Consequently, it is not simply desirable that
the contemporary bar examine ways to cope with this evil; it is
imperative.
Where the cause of air pollution can be isolated and proximately
related to a particular etiological or economic harm, a remedy in tort
on a theory of nuisance4 or ultrahazardous liability' is recognized.
*Law clerk to United States Circuit Judge Thomas E. Fairchild; B.S. 1966, CarnegieMellon University; J.D. 1969, George Washington University; LL.M. 1970, Harvard Law
School.
1. 25 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 723 (May 5, 1967).
2. Eighty tons of dust per month per square mile are estimated to fall in New York City.
N.Y. Times, June 27, 1965, at 12E, col. 1.

3. Hearings on S. 780 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate

Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 3, at 119 (1967); U.S. Public Health
Service, New Medical Materia, July 1961, at 11, and Feb. 1963, at 30; Mitchell, Medical

Tribune, Jan. 11, 1963, at 3, and Jan. 28, 1963, at 33;PulmonaryEmphysema, 1960 Med.
Trial Tech. Q. 221; Greenburg, 182 J.A.M.A. 161 (1962); Noehran, 182 J.A.M.A. 889
(1962); Reid, 49 Proc. Royal Soc'y Med. 767 (1956).
4. E.g., Combs v. Crawford, 258 Ky. 405, 80 S.W.2d 46 (1935) (city dump).
5. E.g., Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal.2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948) (fumigation).
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Similarly, where negligence can be shown, a recovery on that theory
is a possibility. 6 These cases, however, represent a small group of
situations where the offender may be isolated, the alternative causes
can be eliminated, and the damage can be proved and apportioned. 7
The great difficulty involved in setting a standard of due care, and
proving a cause of action for failure to observe it, is apparent when
one considers
that there may be several million polluters in an urban
8
area.
Even if it is assumed that a private remedy could be utilized to
provide damages for air pollution, such a solution would be of little
benefit to the owner of property in an area where the ambient air
becomes too polluted for people to endure. When such a situation
presents itself, property is rendered worthless for any purpose and
damages do not sufficiently compensate the owner. It is in such cases
that the inverse condemnation suit becomes a meaningful possibility.
Such a suit would be particularly appropriate in areas where a major
polluter is a sovereign that has retained its traditional immunity from
suits in tort. It would also be appropriate in a great number of
localities where up to ninety percent of air pollution is caused by
automobiles.9 There is good reason to believe that in certain parts of
the country no measures can be taken to avoid the consequence of a
large amount of land becoming unsuitable for use by human beings.1 In light of such factors the argument that air pollution can
result in a taking of private property does not appear untenable.

II

THE INVERSE CONDEMNATION SUIT
Inherent in our law is the power of eminent domain-"the power
of the sovereign to take property for public use without the owner's
consent upon making just compensation." 1 1 The right to exercise
this attribute of sovereignty is closely aligned with a correlative duty
on the part of the sovereign to make just compensation in all cases
where private property is taken for public use without the owner's
consent.1 2 In the United States this duty is imposed on the sovereign
6. E.g., Smith v. Weber, 70 S.D. 232, 16 N.W.2d 537 (1944).
7. See Rheingold, Civil Cause of Action for Lung Damage Due to Pollution of Urban
Atmosphere, 33 Bkln. L. Rev. 17 (1966).
8. Id. at 27, 28.
9. See Drinkler, 264 N. Eng. J. Med. 754 (1961).
10. See Note, The Expanding Scope of Air Pollution Abatement, 70 W. Va. L. Rev. 195
(1968).
11. 3 Nichols, Eminent Domain, § 8.1 (3d rev. ed. 1963).
12. Id. at 5.

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 11

by the federal constitution.1 This duty, together with the longestablished rule that the just compensation requirement is binding on
the states, 1 4 establishes the basis for an inverse condemnation action
for all nonconsentual takings for public use.
At the outset two frequent misunderstandings should be eliminated. The suit in inverse condemnation is not related to any form of
tort action and is not an exercise of the police power.' s The confusion with tort law concepts stems from numerous efforts to circumvent sovereign immunity from suits in tort by bringing an inverse
action.1 6 It follows that the principles of trespass, nuisance and
sovereign immunity and the concepts of fault and foreseeability have
no place in a discussion of inverse condemnation.' This confusion
has caused a number of courts to hold that a suit in inverse condemnation cannot succeed unless, as against a similarly situated private
party, there could be a recovery in tort.' 8
The confusion with valid exercises of the police power is attributable to the frequent difficulty in distinguishing a regulation
from a taking.' I The resolution of that problem does not lie within
the scope of this discussion. It is sufficient to note here that a proper
exercise of the police power does not result in a taking in the constitutional sense merely because it imposes restraints on the free use
of land.2 0
From what has been said it may be concluded that an inverse
condemnation action is appropriate in those situations where all the
elements of an exercise of the power of eminent domain are present,
with the exception of the constitutionally required just compensation. 2' The word "inverse" is therefore suitable since it is the
private party, rather than the sovereign, who seeks the aid of the
courts.
III

THREE HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS
The following situations will serve to illustrate the types of problems that may arise:
13. U.S. Const. amend. V.
14. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
15. See Van Alystyne, Modernizing Inverse Condemnation:A Legislative Prospectus, 8
Santa Clara Law. 1, 10 (1967).
16. Id. at 11.
17. Cf. Reardon v. City and County of San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 6 P. 317 (1885).
18. E.g., Youngblood v. Los Angeles County Flood Control District, 55 Cal.2d 603, 364
P.2d 840 (1961).
19. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36 (1964). See also Van
Alstyne, supra note 15, at 13.
20. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
21. See Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The ConstitutionalLimits of Public Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L. Rev. 3, 4.

January 1971]

INVERSE CONDEMNA TION AND AIR POLLUTION

151

(I) The corporate owner in fee of a tract of land constructs a
factory on it. The operation of the factory entails a process, a
by-product of which is carbon monoxide gas. The gas is released into
the atmosphere through smokestacks. When the factory begins operating, the entire process is lawful in the area in which the land is
located. Subsequently, the state passes a statute proscribing the releasing of noxious gas into the atmosphere. No practical means exist
for converting the factory into a lawful operation. The corporation
brings an inverse action against the state.
(II) The owner in fee of a tract of land zoned for residential use
constructs a house on it. The state establishes a garbage dump nearby
which causes noxious fumes to be released into the atmosphere. The
fumes greatly diminish the homeowner's enjoyment of his property
and substantially reduce its value. The homeowner brings an inverse
action against the state.
(III) The owner in fee of a tract of land zoned for residential use
constructs a house on it. Nearby, in an area zoned for commercial
use, factories are constructed which release noxious fumes into the
atmosphere. The fumes greatly diminish the homeowner's enjoyment
of his property and substantially reduce its value.
(A) The pollution may be traced to factories which are being
operated in violation of state clean air statutes.
(B) The pollution represents the cumulative effect of a large
number of factories, no one of which is being operated in violation
of state statutes. The homeowner brings an inverse action against the
state.
In each of the three situations the selection of a fee interest is
arbitrary. Should the aggrieved party enjoy an interest inferior to a
fee simple, the substantive issues involved would be unchanged. The
multifaceted problems of just compensation as related to the interest
allegedly taken are not within the scope of this discussion. It is
sufficient to note here that any interest in property that is taken
without just compensation may provide a basis for a suit in inverse
condemnation. 2
The word "state" as used in the three hypothetical cases should be
understood to contemplate federal or state governments as well as
subdivisions of the latter. The fifth amendment mandate that just
compensation be made for the taking of private property for public
use is binding on the states through the due process clause.2 3
22. On the taking of less than a fee interest see generally Waldman, Eminent DomainOptions-Rights of Optionee to Compensation in a Condemnation ProceedingWhen Option
is Exercised After the Taking, 14 Wayne L. Rev. 660 (1968); Comment, Protection of
Mortgagee's Investment when the Security is Condemned in New York, 36 Ford. L. Rev.
586 (1968).
23. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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Furthermore, numerous state constitutions impose a similar obligation.2 4 A subdivision of a state must likewise respond, in an inverse
action, for an unconstitutional taking.2" It follows therefore that the
problem is not substantially altered by changing the sovereign against
whom the action is brought.
It should also be noted that in the second and third cases proposed
above the absence of a feasible private remedy for damages is presumed.' 6 Such an assumption is not unrealistic. In the second case a
remedy for damages would be frustrated by the inability of tort law
to deal with noxious vapors and by the uncertainties involved in
determining when there is sovereign immunity from tort liability. In
the third case also, a remedy for damages would be frustrated by the
inadequacies of tort law and, additionally, by the procedural problems presented by a large number of defendants. In any event a
remedy for damages is obviously unsatisfactory unless coupled with
an injunction to prohibit further air pollution.
Situation I
Of the three situations, the first is most amenable to solution
under existing law. In a landmark case the Supreme Court held that
the previously lawful operation of a brewery could be terminated
without violating the constitutional mandate that a taking for public
use be compensated.2 7 That decision has served as a starting point
for the distinction, recognized by all courts, between a valid exercise
of the police power, which restricts the use of land, and a taking
which appropriates land to public use.2 8 Only in the latter case is
compensation warranted.
In the area of water pollution, it is clearly established that pollution is not a property right.2 9 It follows that any restriction a state
may place on pollution of waterways does not result in a taking
deserving of compensation. Furthermore, where the general operation of a business becomes obnoxious to the community, the use
may be curtailed without there being a taking in the constitutional
3
sense. 0
Although no cases clearly fit the' proposed situation, resort to the
analogous water cases would seem to command a similar result.
Clearly a state may act to protect the health of its citizens by enforc24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

E.g., Cal. Const. art. 1, § 14; N.Y. Const. art. I, § 7.
See, e.g., Page v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, 377 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1964).
See Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 10; Mandelker, supra note 21, at 14.
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
See Sax, supra note 19.
United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
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ing clean air legislation. It has been argued persuasively by one writer
that the federal government could sustain national air pollution
standards under the interstate commerce power.3 1 The fact that air
and water pollution is rarely wholly intrastate could, under the
modern concept of the interstate commerce power, authorize the
federal government to act in this area. The recent federal legislation
concerning air pollution reiterated the conviction expressed in the
first federal air pollution measure, that clean air is primarily a responsibility of the states. 2 As a result of this legislation, it is to be
anticipated that the first cases to reach the courts will be those in
which the alleged taking is by a state.
The cases which follow the principle established in United States
v. Causby3 3 and Griggs v. Allegheny County34 that ownership of
land includes the use of a certain amount of air space above it, may
be clearly distinguished from our situation. Such cases are characterized by affirmative action on the part of the government, which
effectively results in the use of private land for a public purpose.
However, in the case where one's use of his own land is limited by
prohibiting pollution, the government is in no way using such per3
As noted in Griggs, it is the fact that something is
son's lands.
acquired by the public that brings the requirement of just compensation into play.
The recognized distinction between a regulation and a taking has
persuaded at least one writer to conclude that no clean air measure
would provide a basis for an inverse action.3 6 Such claims have been
wholly unsuccessful where the loss of the right to pollute water was
concerned. 3 ' There seems to be substantial agreement that since air
pollutants travel from the land on which they originate, governmental regulation of them does not result in an appropriation for
public use.3 8
31. Edelman, FederalAir and Water Pollution Control: The Application of the Commerce Power to Abate Interstate and Intrastate Pollution, 33 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1067
(1965).
32. The first federal air pollution statute was the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, 42
U.S.C. § 1857. There have been two major amendments. Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L.
No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857; Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L.
No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857.
33. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
34. 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
35. See Sax, supra note 19.
36. Bermingham, The Federal Government and Air and Water Pollution, 23 Bus. Law.
467, 490 (1968).
37. E.g., City of Eufaula, Alabama v. United States, 313 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1963); City
of Demopolis, Alabama v. United States, 334 F.2d 657 (Ct. CL 1964); United States v.
531.13 Acres of Land, 366 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1966).
38. See Bermingham, supra note 36, at 492.
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Assuming, arguendo, that the law must be that no loss of the right
to pollute air should result in a compensable taking, the question
remains whether such a result can be defended by resort to existing
law. As noted earlier, if the particular use to which property is put is
obnoxious enough to the public welfare, it will generally be held that
such use may be terminated altogether without there being a taking.
Where the welfare of a community is sufficiently enhanced, the use
of certain land may be so restricted as to prohibit industry
altogether.3
In the last analysis, when a court decides what is a taking, in the
constitutional sense, it is deciding when the loss of a few persons
resulting from government action should be shared by the public in
general.4 If a taking is found and just compensation necessitated,
the taxpayers within the sovereign's jurisdiction will foot the bill.
The issue then becomes whether such a result is more acceptable
than allowing the polluter to bear the loss alone. The latter alternative seems to be more desirable. First, it would, for the most part,
be those very taxpayers who have a stake in the industrial wealth of
the community who would be paying the price of the acquisition.
Such a process obviously leads nowhere. Second, by spreading the
cost throughout the community, persons guilty of air pollution will
not be greatly encouraged to explore technological means for correcting the problem and those persons who, through care and expense, have "cleaned up" their operations will be rewarded by having
to compensate the less ambitious members of the community.
Situation II
The second situation is representative of problems which a large
number of landowners have already encountered. Unfortunately for
most of them, a recovery where a sovereign interferes with a private
person's use of his land by polluting the air is very difficult. There
are of course a few cases where the injury has been so peculiar to the
particular landowner that a taking has been found.4 1 But in the great
bulk of cases, the long-established rule that air pollution does not
result in a taking requiring compensation has been applied.4 2
The early common law recognized ownership in land to extend a
coelo usque ad centrum (from the heavens to the center of the
39. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
40. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1168 (1967).
41. E.g., Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914). The owner of land
directly in the exhaust stream of a municipal corporation's tunnel was permitted recovery.
42. E.g., Sadlier v. City of New York, 185 N.Y. 408, 78 N.E. 272 (1906).
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earth).4" With the advent of the age of flight, realistic limitations
had to be placed on this doctrine. Notwithstanding these limitations,
it is still recognized that the owner of land is entitled to enjoy
freedom from certain invasions of the superadjacent air space. The ad
coelum doctrine is now restricted primarily to cases where the invasion is the physical presence of airplanes flying within very close
proximity to the ground.4 4
The courts have given a variety of reasons for not permitting
recovery for air pollution which is within the same superadjacent air
space recognized in the airplane cases as the ambit of a property
owner's domain. A rule was early developed by the federal courts
that a taking meant an actual physical occupation or invasion of
private land.4 ' Fortunately, this rule is losing a good deal of its
impact as progressive courts come to recognize that there are an
infinite number of ways in which property can effectively be taken,
although the owner's title and possession is in no way challenged.4 6
Furthermore, a considerable number of state constitutions have been
amended to include the word "damaged" as well as the word
"taken" in their respective just compensation clauses.4 Such a revision is suggestive of a broader understanding of what is entailed in
meaningful ownership of property. It is probable that the trend
towards liberalizing the meaning of a taking will continue.
Another obstacle which stands between a plaintiff and his recovery in an inverse action for a taking by air pollution caused by the
sovereign is the requirement of foreseeability.4 8 This requirement is
obviously a result of the confusion with tort principles mentioned
earlier. It is encouraging to note that one important jurisdiction has
recently abandoned foreseeability as a requisite element for recovery
in an inverse action.4 The fact that an inverse action is based on a
constitutional mandate would logically obviate the requirement.
Furthermore, it is apparent that to one whose property interest is
diminished, it matters little whether the ultimate result was reasonably anticipated when the sovereign undertook the activity.
In addition to the difficulties already discussed, is the further
hindrance presented by a rule established in the Supreme Court that
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

2 Nichols, Eminent Domain, § 5.781 (3d rev. ed. 1963).
Cf City of Atlantav. Donald, 111 Ga. App. 339, 141 S.E.2d 560 (1965).
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
E.g., Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) (dam resulted in taking of water rights).
The first to do so was Illinois in 1870. Ill. Const. art. II, § 13. Twenty-five states

have followed the lead.
48. See Case Notes, Inverse Condemnation, ForeseeabilityAbandoned in California, 13
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 871 (1966), and cases collected therein.
49. Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal.2d 250, 398 P.2d 129 (1965) (road slide).
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"acts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not
directly encroaching upon private property.., are universally held
not to be a taking within the meaning of the constitutional provision."' 0 Avoidance of this rule would seem to require a demonstration that air pollution is a direct encroachment on private property.
Such a showing is most difficult because in the first instance polluted
air is usually released far from the property of the prospective plaintiff and only reaches his property by the intervening force of winds.
It follows that the eventual encroachment upon private property is
not direct.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has had occasion to hear a case very
much in point and has come to the sorry conclusion that odors from
a sewage disposal plant which wafted over plaintiff's land did not
result in a taking deserving of compensations I The court reasoned
that the plaintiff simply shared in the burden of a beneficial exercise
of governmental power in return for the privilege of sharing in the
use of the sewage system. 2 It is not difficult to imagine, however,
why the Ohio plaintiff could not concur in the court's utilitarian
judgment. This would seem to be a case where property is made so
unbearable that for all practical purposes the use of it is taken.
It may be strongly argued that the taking should not have to be as
direct as in cases such asRichardsv. Washington Terminal Company,I 3
for compensation to be awarded. The case of City of Jacksonville v.
Schumann s 4 represents a high-water mark in finding a taking resulting from an airborne disturbance not occasioned by a direct invasion
of private property. That case held that there could be a recovery in
an inverse action for noise, dust and vibrations caused by the close
proximity of the defendant city's airport. The court recognized that
in so far as the property owner was concerned, the disturbance in the
air was just as much a taking as was the actual use of the air in
Causby." s In both cases the use of the superadjacent air space resulted in precluding any possible enjoyment of the property. From
the owner's point of view, the degree of injury to his interest is not
at all dependent on obscure legal distinctions.
In a recent Florida decision the doctrine expressed in Schumann
was greatly limited." 6 In that case recovery for noise, dust and
vibrations due to construction of an access road adjoining plaintiff's
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Transportation Company v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878).
McKee v. City of Akron, 176 Ohio St. 282, 199 N.E.2d 592 (1964).
Id. at 286, 199 N.E.2d 595.
233 U.S. 546 (1914).
167 So.2d 95 (Fla. 1964).
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
Northcutt v. State Road Department, 209 So.2d 710 (Fla. 1968).

January 19711

INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND AIR POLLUTION

157

property was not permitted. The court, apparently fearful of opening
the door to all sorts of litigation, distinguished Schumann on the
tenuous basis that the area involved was labeled "Recommended For
Non-Residential Development" by the Federal Aviation Agency.5
The abrupt turnabout in this case is suggestive of the delicate
situation in which courts find themselves when they try to balance
the rights of individual litigants to enjoy their land against the necessity for local governments to complete airports, sewers, roads and
other community projects. It is clear that if such public works are to
be constructed, compensation cannot be awarded to anyone, however remotely affected.
The purpose here is not to establish guidelines for when there has
been a taking worthy of compensation. If the discussion of this
situation has served to illustrate that the traditional requirements of
a physical taking, a foreseeable harm and a direct encroachment do
not provide a suitable criteria, it has served its purpose. Too often
the law lags behind contemporary problems and by so doing permits
injustice to be worked in individual cases.
The long line of cases that recognize that a substantial diminution
of value effects a taking are particularly well adapted to this
situation.' 8 A not unduly broad reading of such cases would command the result reached in the Schumann case. The fear of encouraging litigation should never prevent a court from reaching a
result which gives meaningful interpretation to constitutional guarantees. Admittedly, undue reliance on the diminution of value test
alone would not always yield a reasonable result; the resolution of
this problem entails the consideration of a large number of factors.5 9
The point made here is simply that judicial recognition of losses due
to air pollution is necessary if courts are to fairly distribute the
burden of this growing problem.
'

Situation III
A successful inverse action grounded upon the failure of a
sovereign to promulgate or enforce regulations dealing with air pollution has not yet been maintained. The problems presented in bringing such an action include not only the difficulties discussed in
Situation II, but the additional obstacle of fastening responsibility on
a political body for failure to take affirmative action against a third
party.
57. Id. at 711.
58. The leading case on diminution of value as a taking is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
59. See Michelman, supra note 40, at 1190.
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In the field of tort law, courts have rarely permitted a recovery for
the failure of a municipality to act in the public interest. Traditionally, in the absence of a contract to enforce or promulgate rules
or a statutory declaration of liability, there could be no recovery for
mere nonfeasance on the part of a state or municipality. 6" The
difficulty in recovering has not been due to the existence of
sovereign immunity but rather to the well-established rule that the
exercise of executive functions is purely discretionary. 6' Only in
those cases where a nuisance was caused by affirmative action on the
part of a municipality has recovery been allowed.6 2 Apparently it
has been of no importance that the activity complained of was permitted to exist in flagrant violation of a city ordinance for a long
period of time. 6 The federal courts have found little difficulty
denying recovery, regardless of whether the claim was controlled by
state or federal law.6 4
It is of course true that success in an inverse action is not dependent on overcoming unfavorable tort precedents. It does seem,
however, that if the sovereign cannot be held answerable for damages
for an immediate injury to property caused by a third person, it will
be an ambitious feat indeed to demonstrate that by failing to abate
air pollution the sovereign has been guilty of an uncompensated
taking. Although one writer has suggested negligence as a possible
theory for recovery for failure on the part of the sovereign to curtail
air pollution, 6 1 it does not appear that any commentator has considered recovery in an inverse action under such circumstances as a
serious possibility.
Of course it is possible for there to be a private remedy for
damages or injunction in cases where the polluters can be isolated.
There will be situations, however, where no violation of duty,
statutory or otherwise, can be shown, or the number of possible
defendants is so great that a remedy of this sort becomes procedurally awkward. It will therefore be fruitful to consider if there is
a constitutional basis for an inverse action against a sovereign for
failure to act to abate air pollution.
Assuming, arguendo, that air pollution can result in a taking, the
60. 38 Am. Jur. Municipal Corporations § 603 (1941).
61. E.g., Everly v. Adams, 95 Kan. 305, 147 P. 1134 (1915).
62. Cf Milstrey v. City of Hackensack, 6 N.J. 400, 79 A.2d 37 (1951).
63. Galleher v. City of Wichita, 179 Kan. 513, 296 P.2d 1062 (1956).
64. Murray v. City of Milford, 380 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1967) (state law); National Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967
(1955) (Federal Tort Claims Act).

65. See Rheingold, supra note 7, at 28, 29.
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question remains: a taking by whom? If in our situation it is found
to be private parties that cause the damage, a possible argument is
that the private parties must be looked to for any redress. If such is
the case, no recovery in inverse condemnation is feasible. Even if it is
argued that the sovereign, by countenancing the activities of the
private parties, is in fact responsible for them, still no basis for a
claim in inverse condemnation arises. The sovereign may not use the
power of eminent domain to take private property for a private use,
even if just compensation is made. 6 6 As indicated earlier, an inverse
condemnation action is appropriate where all the elements of an
exercise of eminent domain, except just compensation, are present.
It follows, therefore, that in this case such an action is not appropriate because the element of a public use is absent. The argument that the sovereign must answer for the taking occasioned by
private action must therefore fail.
The other possibility is to proceed by contending that it is in fact
the sovereign itself that does the taking. If this can be established, a
recovery in an inverse action may be had. The contention that the
sovereign itself does the taking requires placing an affirmative duty
on it to abate air pollution. The argument falters here, in the face of
the already noted principle that an exercise of executive functions is
discretionary. If the prospective defendant were a state, it might be
argued that the federal clean air statutes place an affirmative duty on
the states to abate air pollution.6 7 Concededly, the logic is cumbersome, but it seems foreseeable that a time will come when courts will
be willing to place greater affirmative duties on governmental bodies.
A more direct, though equally speculative argument may be made
as follows: The activities which are permitted in a given community
will be those which, on balance, the lawmaking body decides ought
to exist. The power of eminent domain may be exercised for any
object which is within the broad responsibilities of government.6 8
When a proceeding in eminent domain is brought, the judicial process
is used to determine if in fact the object for which private property is
condemned is proper. If the inverse action is a correlative action to
the proceeding in eminent domain, should it not be available to bring
judicial scrutiny to bear on all questions of whether the effectuation
of a particular purpose results in the taking of private property for a
public use?
66. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896) (held a taking for private use
violated due process).
67. See note 32, supra.
68. Cf Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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The argument as outlined is to a certain extent dependent on
whether there could be a delegation of the power of eminent domain
to all those who pollute the air. If there could not, then the argument for a suit in inverse condemnation where a state permits others
to pollute the air becomes untenable. It has been established that the
power of eminent domain may be delegated to certain bodies which
are created by the authority of a state or the federal government. 9
The power has even been held to be delegable to a private individual,
where such delegation was ultimately for a public purpose. 70 It
would seem that the next logical step is to say that a state, by
chartering a corporation or licensing a business which in its operation
appropriates private property, has in fact given that operation the
power of eminent domain. If this reasoning will pass muster, then it
follows that if the polluter in such instance fails to make just compensation, an inverse action against it or the state will lie.
The theories suggested here are of course speculative. No court has
gone so far as to find liability in a situation such as the one presented. It may be that a landowner will before long venture such a
suit for want of a remedy for air pollution.

IV
CONCLUSION
It should be clear from this discussion that the law of inverse
condemnation needs much development if it is to deal effectively
with the problem of air pollution. The direction in which courts and
legislatures must point themselves is clear. In the first situation discussed, the law has already provided a solution. The loss of the right
to pollute does not provide a basis for an inverse action. In the
second situation the law is not nearly adequate. The sovereign may
take property by polluting the air and nearly always avoid making
just compensation. In the third situation the law is wholly impotent.
Responsibility for persistent failure on the part of governmental
bodies to act to abate air pollution will not result in an obligation to
compensate in any court.
It is apparent that the judicial process is ill-equipped to deal with
so great an evil without the help of other branches of government.
Changes of the necessary magnitude require a high degree of planning
in order to insure lasting solutions. The urgent need for technology
69. Malott v. Collinsville, C. & E. St. L. Elec. R. Co., 108 F. 313 (7th Cir. 1901)
(railroad); Arkansas State H'way Comn'n v. Southeastern Bell Tel. Co., 206 Ark. 1099, 178
S.W.2d 1002 (1944) (utility).
70. United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 43 F.Supp. 561 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
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to create automobiles and factories and garbage disposals which do
not generate pollution cannot be overemphasized. What is suggested
here is that the courts have been slow to recognize an analogy between air pollution and the more traditional invasions of property. In
this respect they have failed to provide other sectors of government
with needed impetus for change.

